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Abstract. One of the main challenges in RFIDs is the design of privacy-
preserving authentication protocols. Indeed, such protocols should not
only allow legitimate readers to authenticate tags but also protect these
latter from privacy-violating attacks, ensuring their anonymity and un-
traceability: an adversary should not be able to get any information that
would reveal the identity of a tag or would be used for tracing it. In this
paper, we analyze some recently proposed RFID authentication proto-
cols that came with provable security flavours. Our results are the first
known privacy cryptanalysis of the protocols.
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1 Introduction
Radio frequency identification (RFID) tags are being deployed in many
consumer, financial and governmental applications, for instance respec-
tively in supply chain [1, 6, 20, 21, 32], in contactless credit cards [13], and
in e-passports [15, 5, 14, 17, 22].
In view of the pervasiveness and inconspicuous nature of these tiny
RFIDs, privacy for RFID tag users is a major concern that could po-
tentially impede the public’s long-term adoption of RFID-enabled appli-
cations. To the best of our knowledge, formal treatments of privacy for
RFID protocols include the work of Avoine [2], Juels and Weis [16], Le,
Burmester and de Medeiros [18]; and Vaudenay [34, 35, 26]. The difference
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in these models lie basically in the power of the adversary’s tag-corruption
ability.
We analyze in this paper the privacy (or security when relevant) issues
of the following provably-secure RFID authentication protocols: the pro-
tocol by Lim and Kwon [19] at ICICS ’06, and two protocols at AsiaCCS
’07 by Le et al. [18]. The first protocol is a nice unconventional design
in the sense that it achieves both forward and backward untraceability
in the face of tag corruption, while typical protocols only provide back-
ward untraceability. That paper also defined a provable security model
for backward and forward untraceability. The latter two protocols are in-
teresting since they come with provable security in the sense of universal
composability [4] which has strong guarantees. In fact, except for subsec-
tions 4.2 and 4.3 corresponding to breaks on forward privacy/security and
therefore the notion of tag corruption is inevitably assumed by definition,
our attacks do not even need the strong requirement of corrupting tags
[33, 16, 34, 19, 18, 35].
2 RFID Privacy Models
For completeness and for better clarity, we describe here the general un-
traceable privacy (UPriv) model [25] that will be the setting in which we
use in later sections to demonstrate how to trace tags and thus show that
the schemes do not achieve the notion of untraceable privacy.
In fact, the model defined herein can be seen as an alternative defini-
tion of the Juels-Weis model [16] in a style more in line with the Bellare
et al. [3] models for authenticated key exchange (AKE) protocols, for
which RFID protocols can be seen to have close relationship with. With
this model as a reference, our emphasis throughout this paper is on the
analysis of the privacy (or security) issues of recent RFID protocols.
A protocol party is a T ∈ Tags or R ∈ Readers interacting in proto-
col sessions as per the protocol specifications until the end of the session
upon which each party outputs Accept if it feels the protocol has been
normally executed with the correct parties. Adversary A controls the
communications between all protocol parties (tag and reader) by inter-
acting with them as defined by the protocol, formally captured by A’s
ability to issue queries of the following form:
Execute(R, T , i) query. This models passive attacks, where adversary A
gets access to an honest execution of the protocol session i between
R and T by eavesdropping.
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Send(U1, U2, i,m) query. This query models active attacks by allowing
the adversary A to impersonate some reader U1 ∈ Readers (resp.
tag U1 ∈ Tags) in some protocol session i and send a message m
of its choice to an instance of some tag U2 ∈ Tags (resp. reader
U2 ∈ Readers). This query subsumes the TagInit and ReaderInit
queries as well as challenge and response messages in the Juels-Weis
model.
Corrupt(T ,K) query. This query allows the adversary A to learn the
stored secret K ′ of the tag T ∈ Tags, and which further sets the stored
secret to K. It captures the notion of forward security or forward
privacy and the extent of the damage caused by the compromise of
the tag’s stored secret. This is the equivalent of the SetKey query of
the Juels-Weis model.
TestUPriv(U, i) query. This query is the only query that does not corre-
spond to any of A’s abilities or any real-world event. This query allows
to define the indistinguishability-based notion of untraceable privacy
(UPriv). If the party has accepted and is being asked a Test query,
then depending on a randomly chosen bit b ∈ {0, 1}, A is given Tb
from the set {T0, T1}. Informally, A succeeds if it can guess the bit b.
In order for the notion to be meaningful, a Test session must be fresh
in the sense of Definition 2.
Definition 1 (Partnership & Session Completion) We say that a
reader instance Rj and a tag instance Ti are partners if, and only if,
both have output Accept(Ti) and Accept(Rj) respectively, signifying the
completion of the protocol session.
Definition 2 (Freshness) A party instance is fresh at the end of exe-
cution if, and only if,
1. it has output Accept with or without a partner instance,
2. both the instance and its partner instance (if such a partner exists)
have not been sent a Corrupt query.
Definition 3 (Untraceable Privacy (UPriv)) UPriv is defined using
the game G played between a malicious adversary A and a collection of
reader and tag instances. A runs the game G whose setting is as follows.
Phase 1 (Learning): A is able to send any Execute, Send, and
Corrupt queries at will.
Phase 2 (Challenge):
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1. At some point during G, A will choose a fresh session on which to
be tested and send a Test query corresponding to the test session.
Note that the test session chosen must be fresh in the sense of
Definition 2. Depending on a randomly chosen bit b ∈ {0, 1}, A is
given a tag Tb from the set {T0, T1}.
2. A continues making any Execute, Send, and Corrupt queries at
will, subjected to the restrictions that the definition of freshness
described in Definition 2 is not violated.
Phase 3 (Guess): Eventually, A terminates the game simulation and
outputs a bit b′, which is its guess of the value of b.
The success of A in winning G and thus breaking the notion of UPriv is
quantified in terms of A’s advantage in distinguishing whether A receives
T0 or T1, i.e. it correctly guessing b. This is denoted by AdvUPrivA (k) where
k is the security parameter. In relation to other models, note that the
Le-Burmester-de Medeiros model [18] similarly allows the corruption of
tags. For the purpose of our attack descriptions in later subsections 4.2
and 4.3, it suffices to consider their definition of corruption in their model.
This will be treated later as required.
The Vaudenay model [34, 35] is stronger than both the Juels-Weis and
Le-Burmester-de Medeiros models in terms of the adversary’s corruption
ability. In more detail, it is stronger than the Juels-Weis model in the
sense that it allows corruption even of the two tags used in the challenge
phase. It is stronger than the Le-Burmester-de Medeiros model in the
sense that it considers all its privacy notions even for corrupted tags,
in contrast to the Le-Burmester-de Medeiros model that only considers
corruption for its forward privacy notion.
We chose to describe our tracing attacks in later sections with ref-
erence to a defined model in order for more uniformity between similar
attacks on different RFID protocols, and for better clarity to illustrate
how an adversary can circumvent the protocols using precise types of in-
teractions that he exploits, as captured by his oracle queries. This will
facilitate the task of a designer when an attempt is made to redesign a
protocol which had been attacked.
3 A Backward and Forward Untraceable Protocol
At ICICS ’06, Lim and Kwon [19] proposed an RFID protocol that offers
untraceable privacy (UPriv) both before and after corruption of a tag.
This is indeed a major feat, since other RFID schemes in literature are
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only able to treat backward untraceability, i.e. a corrupted tag cannot be
linked to any past completed sessions.
The initialization phase is as follows:
1. The reader chooses a random secret Ki for each tag Ti, and evaluates
m − 1 evolutions of K0i = Ki, i.e. Kji = g(Kj−1i ) for 1 ≤ j ≤ m − 1,
where g is a pseudorandom function. It then computes tji = extl2(K
j
i )
for 0 ≤ j ≤ m− 1, where l2 is some appropriate bit length, extl(x) is
an extraction function returning l bits of x.
2. The reader also chooses a random ui for each tag Ti and computes a
key chain {wji }n−1j=0 of length n, such that wni = ui and wji = h(wj+1i )
for 0 ≤ j ≤ n− 1, where h is a pseudorandom function.
3. The tag stores 〈wi,T ,Ki〉 where wi,T = w0i and initializes a failure
counter ci = 0.
4. The reader creates two tables L1, L2 for Ti in its database, where L2
is empty and L1 has entries of the form 〈si, {tji}m−1j=0 , ui, ni, wi,T , wi,S〉
where ni = n and wi,S = w1i thus wi,T = h(wi,S).
After initialization, a normal protocol session is illustrated in Fig. 1, where
f is a pseudorandom function. For further discussions on this protocol,
the interested reader is referred to [19].
Reader R Tag Ti
Database: {. . . , (Ki, tables L1, L2), . . . } Secret: wi,T , ci,Ki
pick r1
r1−−−−→
calculate ti = extl2(Ki)
pick r2
ti,r2,σ1←−−−− compute σ1 = extl1(f(Ki, r1||r2)).
check ∃tji : (tji = ti) ∧ (tji ∈ {tki }m−1k=0 )∧
〈Ki, {tki }m−1k=0 , ui, ni, wi,T , wi,S〉 ∈ (L1 ∪ L2)
calculate K′i = g(Ki)
j , σ′1 = extl2(f(K
′
i, r1||r2))
and check that σ′1 = σ1
calculate σ2 = f(K
′
i, r2||r1)⊕ wi,S σ2−−−−→ wi,S = f(Ki, r2||r1)⊕ σ2.
for k = 0 . . .m− j − 1 calculate: tˆki = tj+k+1i ; check h(wi,S) = wi,T .
for k = m− j . . .m− 1 calculate: If yes:
Kˆi = g(K
′
i), tˆ
k
i = extl2(g(Kˆi)
k−m+j); ci = 0;wi,T = wi,S ;
update Kˆi, {tki }m−1k=0 in L2 Ki = g(Ki ⊕ (wi,T ||r1||r2)).
calculate Ki = g(Ki ⊕ (wi,S ||r1||r2)); else
tji = extl2(g(Ki)
j) for j = 0 . . .m− 1; ci = ci + 1;
ni = ni − 1, wi,T = wi,S , wi,S = h(ui)ni if ci < m
update 〈Ki, {tki }m−1k=0 , ni, wi,T , wi,S〉 in L1 update Ki = g(Ki).
Fig. 1. The backward and forward untraceable RFID protocol
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Tracing the Tag. For the purpose of understanding our attack, it suf-
fices to review the gist of the Lim-Kwon protocol. The tag updates its
stored secret Ki in two possible ways. If the reader is successfully authenti-
cated, it would update as Ki = g(Ki⊕ (wi,T ||r1||r2)). Else, the tag would
update as Ki = g(Ki), up to m times of unsuccessful authentications,
after which the tag stops updating its Ki. This eventual non-updating
allows the reader to catch up.
Our attack works nevertheless, as follows, using the basic principle
where we intentionally desynchronize the tag from the reader by sending
the tag into the future [19].
1. Learning: An adversary sends m number of queries rj1 for 1 ≤ j ≤ m
to the tag T0, and records the tag’s response tj for 1 ≤ j ≤ m. Since
the adversary is impersonating the reader, thus each time it will not
pass the check by the tag, and so each time the tag would update its
stored secret as Ki = g(Ki), from which ti will be derived in the next
session.
2. Challenge: Query rm1 to the tag Tb ∈ {T0, T1}, and obtain its response
t∗.
3. Guess: Check if t∗ = tm. If so, then the adversary knows this was the
tag it queried during the learning phase i.e. Tb = T0. Else, it knows
that Tb = T1.
It was remarked in [19] that once a tag is successfully authenticated by
a reader, then the tag’s stored secret Ki would be freshly randomized so
that tracing of any kind is prevented. Yet, our adversary can repeat the
above step of the Learning phase by sending m arbitrary queries rj1 for
1 ≤ j ≤ m to the tag again to desynchronize it and the same tracing
attack applies.
In order to solve the DoS problem, the authors included into the
design a feature that unfortunately allowed our attack causing the tag to
be traceable even without corruption, although the goal for their protocol
was much stronger i.e. backward and forward untraceability even with
corruption.
Violating the Forward Untraceability. Another goal of the protocol
is to achieve forward untraceability, i.e. even if a tag is corrupted thus
leaking its stored secret Ki, it should be impossible for the adversary to
trace the tag in future sessions. Nevertheless, an attack by the adversary
proceeds as follows, using the example application in [19] of a tag embed-
ded in a purchased item: Initially, the seller’s reader R1 has legitimate
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access to the tag. At the point of purchase, ownership of this access should
transfer to the buyer’s reader R2. The attack can be mounted either by
the seller’s reader or by an outsider adversary having access to Corrupt
queries.
1. An outsider adversary issues a Corrupt query to the tag Tb, obtaining
its stored secret Ki. Alternatively, the seller’s reader R1 knows the
stored secret Ki and wi,T .
2. At the point of purchase, the buyer’s reader R2 interacts with the
tag in a protocol session, thus updating Ki. During this time, the
adversary eavesdrops on the values r1, r2 communicated in the session.
3. Right after the interaction between the tag and the buyer’s reader
R2, the adversary initiates a protocol session with the tag. Since it
knows the previous Ki, and also the latest values of r1, r2, it can
recompute the latest Ki = g(Ki ⊕ (wi,T ||r1||r2)) and thus pass the
check by the tag without any problem. It can therefore trace the tag
in all future sessions, and other readers including the buyer’s can no
longer successfully interact with the tag.
This result counters the protocol’s claim that its ownership transfer is
perfect. In [19], it was argued that the protocol achieves forward untrace-
ability under the assumption that the adversary cannot eavesdrop on all
future legitimate interactions involving the tag and the reader; the above
attack works without violating that assumption. [19] furthermore gives a
provable security model for forward untraceability in its Appendix, yet
their protocol was not rigourously proven under that model, but instead
its security was supported with brief arguments.
4 O-FRAP and O-FRAKE
At AsiaCCS ’07, Le et al. [18] presented a universally composable [4] pri-
vacy model for RFID protocols, and proposed O-FRAP and O-FRAKE.
These two protocols are shown in figures 2 and 3 respectively, on which
F denotes a pseudorandom function.
4.1 Tracing O-FRAP
O-FRAP is formally proven to be a secure untraceable RFID protocol in
the Le-Burmester-deMedeiros model where corruption of tags is allowed,
in the sense that the only information revealed to an adversary is if a
party is a tag or a reader. Yet we show here how its untraceable privacy
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Reader Rj Tag Ti
Database: {. . . , (ri,Ki), . . . } Secret: ri,Ki
pick r
r−−−−→ calculate:
ri,v2←−−−− v1||v2||v3||v4||v5 = F (Ki, r||ri)
check ∃(ri, ,Ki) in DB update ri = v1.
calculate v′1||v′2||v′3||v′4 = F (Ki, r||ri)
check v′2 = v2
output Accept(Ti)
update (ri,Ki) = (v
′
1, v
′
4) in DB
v′3−−−−→ check v3 = v′3.
output Accept(Rj).
update Ki = v4
Fig. 2. The O-FRAP protocol
can be violated by presenting a tracing attack that is valid even in a
weaker privacy model were corruption possibilty is not granted to the
adversary.
Reader Rj Tag Ti
Database: {. . . , (ri,Ki, SKi), . . . } Secret: ri,Ki, SKi
pick r
r−−−−→ calculate
ri,v2←−−−− v1||v2||v3||v4||v5 = F (Ki, r||ri)
check ∃(ri, ,Ki, SKi) in DB update ri = v1.
calculate v′1||v′2||v′3||v′4||v′5 = F (Ki, r||ri)
check v′2 = v2
output Accept(Ti, SKi)
update (ri,Ki, SKi) = (v
′
1, v
′
4, v
′
5) in DB
v′3−−−−→ check v3 = v′3.
output Accept(Rj , SKi).
update 〈Ki, SKi〉 = 〈v4, v5〉.
Fig. 3. The O-FRAKE protocol
The attack works as follows:
1. Learning: The adversary sends an arbitrary r value to the tag T0,
but does not complete the protocol. This causes the tag to update its
ri, while its Ki remains unchanged, thus marking the tag for future
tracing.
2. Challenge: To trace the tag in future, the adversary observes the
interaction between the reader and the tag Tb.
3. Guess: If the reader does not output Accept, then the adversary
knows that this tag was indeed the tag that it marked in step (1),
i.e. Tb = T0. Otherwise, he deduces that Tb = T1.
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4.2 Violating the Forward Privacy of O-FRAP
In the Le-Burmester-deMedeiros model, corruption is not allowed before
a protocol session is initiated, and it is assumed that upon corruption
of a party (tag or reader) then the corrupted party’s current incomplete
session offers no privacy. It is claimed that privacy is maintained for all
previously completed sessions involving the heretheto corrupted party.
To motivate our case, we consider the definition of subsession com-
pletion in the Le-Burmester-deMedeiros model. A subsession is a party’s
view of its current protocol session, e.g. during an O-FRAP protocol ses-
sion, both the reader and the tag have their own separate views of that
session, so-called their subsession. To quote from [18], “Upon successful
completion of a subsession, each party accepts its corresponding partner
as authenticated.” Thus, at the point where a party outputs Accept, its
subsession is already considered completed.
Referring to the O-FRAP description in Fig. 2, the reader’s subsession
is completed at the point when it outputs Accept, i.e. before it updates
its entry in L and before it sends v′3 to the tag. Meanwhile, the tag’s
subsession is completed at the point that it outputs Accept, i.e. before
it updates its Ki. In the context of the Le-Burmester-deMedeiros model,
corruption of a party at this point should not violate the privacy of the
party corresponding to its completed subsession. This is the problem with
the O-FRAP proof that we are exploiting. Indeed, we show how this can
be circumvented.
1. The adversary first eavesdrops on an O-FRAP session and records
〈r, ri, v2〉.
2. It then corrupts a tag T ′i at the point after the tag outputs Accept. It
thus obtains K ′i corresponding to a previoulsy completed subsession,
and not the updated K ′i = v4.
3. The adversary calculates v∗1||v∗2||v∗3||v∗4 = F (K ′i, r||ri). It can then
check the computed v∗2 with its recorded v2 for a match, thereby associ-
ating the tag T ′i to the particular completed subsession corresponding
to its recorded 〈r, ri, v2〉.
Our attack here requires a stronger adversary than the other attacks we
have presented in earlier sections of this paper, yet it fits into the Le-
Burmester-deMedeiros model for which O-FRAP’s privacy was proven,
and shows that O-FRAP does not achieve its goal of forward untraceable
privacy.
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It appears that O-FRAP can be made to resist this attack by having
the tag output Accept as the very last step of the protocol, i.e. after Ki
has been updated.
4.3 Breaking the Forward Secrecy of O-FRAKE
The above attack can be extended to break the forward secrecy of the
O-FRAKE protocol, which is an extension of O-FRAP that furthermore
establishes a shared secret session key between the tag and reader.
1. The adversary first eavesdrops on an O-FRAKE session and records
〈r, ri, v2〉.
2. It then corrupts a tag T ′i at the point after the tag outputs Accept.
It thus obtains 〈K ′i, SK ′i〉 corresponding to a previously completed
subsession, and not the updated 〈K ′i, SK ′i〉 = 〈v4, v5〉.
3. The adversary calculates v∗1||v∗2||v∗3||v∗4||v∗5 = F (K ′i, r||ri). It can then
check the computed v∗2 with its recorded v2 for a match, thereby associ-
ating the tag T ′i to the particular completed subsession corresponding
to its recorded 〈r, ri, v2〉; and further it also knows that the established
session key for that associated session is SK ′i.
Similarly, it appears that O-FRAKE can be made to resist this attack by
having the tag output Accept as the very last step of the protocol, i.e.
after 〈Ki, SKi〉 have been updated.
5 Concluding Remarks
We described in an alternative manner the privacy models that capture
the notion of untraceable privacy (UPriv) and briefly discussed its relation
to existing models. The aim was to use this notion to show how some
recent provably secure RFID protocols (with proofs of security in strong
adversarial models) do not achieve this privacy notion even under the
weak adversarial model that does not require corruption of tags. In some
sense, these results support the case [7–12, 27, 28] that while provable
security is the right approach to design and analysis of protocols, more
careful analysis and interpretation of provable security models and proofs
are needed to ensure the right definitions [30] are put in place.
As a commonly accepted model addressing privacy and security in
RFID has to be established and many RFID protocols are proposed with-
out providing any formal security proof, these results strengthen the need
for such a model to facilitate better design of RFID protocols that offer
both privacy and security.
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“Big Brother is watching you”.
George Orwell, Nineteen Eighty-Four.
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